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unlikely, particularly given the U.S. 
predisposition toward pushing for a Syria-Iran 
split. Nevertheless, we do not know where 
Obama is going to come down. 
Regarding Israel-Palestinian issues, looking 
at developments on the ground, it is difficult to 
see this as being a good time for making any 
progress on the Palestinian track. Still, there 
will be a new Middle East coordinator in this 
administration, and there is, I think, a 
predisposition to push on this track. I have a 
hard time seeing this as an initial priority of 
the administration given other pressing issues. 
Nevertheless, I think the Obama 
administration will have an ambitious agenda. 
Its focus on diplomacy and coalition-building 
will benefit from a tremendous amount of 
international goodwill, at least initially, as 
well as the belief he can bring “hope” and 
“change.” But I think that within a year, 
Obama, too, will have to deal with the realities 
of the Middle East. 
 
*David Schenker is a senior fellow and 
director of the Program on Arab Politics at 
The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy. Previously, he served in the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense as Levant country 
director. He is author of Palestinian 
Democracy and Governance: An Appraisal of 
the Legislative Council (2001). 
 
THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY, OIL, AND 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
John S. Duffield* 
 
During the presidential campaign, 
candidate Barack Obama described America’s 
dependence on oil as one of the greatest 
challenges that the country has ever faced. He 
said that high oil prices threatened to drag 
down the U.S. economy. The transfer of 
wealth to oil-producing countries, “many of 
them hostile to our interests,” was viewed as a 
threat to U.S. national security. And the 
combustion of oil, along with other fossil 
fuels, posed a serious threat to the 
environment.1 
The campaign hinted that an Obama 
presidency would seek energy independence. 
But with regard to oil, it established and 
emphasized a much more specific and 
presumably achievable goal. Within 10 years, 
the United States would save more oil than it 
currently imports from the Middle East and 
Venezuela combined. 
What would the achievement of this goal 
actually entail? According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, the United States 
consumed approximately 20.7 million barrels 
per day (mbd) of oil in 2007. That same year, 
it imported 2.17 mbd from the Persian Gulf (of 
which Saudi Arabia provided more than two-
thirds) and 1.36 mbd from Venezuela. If North 
Africa is included in the Middle East--since 
Libya and Algeria provide another 0.7 to 0.8 
mbd of petroleum--U.S. imports from the two 
regions combined amounted to some 5.0 mbd, 
or almost 25 percent of U.S. oil consumption.2 
How would the Obama administration 
achieve this goal? The first thing to note is that 
it does not actually require reducing U.S. oil 
imports from the Middle East or Venezuela, 
just reducing consumption by an amount equal 
in the size to those imports. Thus, the goal 
could be achieved while imports from those 
regions remained constant or even increased. 
In that sense, the goal is a more realistic one 
than attempting to restrict imports from 
particular countries. Given the fungible nature 
of today’s oil market, it is difficult and 
sometimes economically inefficient to do so. 
But this reality also underscores the difficulty 
of achieving one of the avowed goals of an 
Obama energy policy: to reduce the transfer of 
wealth to hostile oil-producing countries. 
Unless the United States can engineer either a 
decline in those countries’ exports or in the 
world price of oil, then they will continue to 
                                                          
1 “Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for 
America,” 
Uhttp://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_s
peech_080308.pdfU (accessed November 10, 2008). 
2 Energy Information Agency (EIA), Annual Energy 
Review 2007, Report No. DOE/EIA-0384 (2007) 
(Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2008), 
Uhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdfU (access
November 10, 2008). 
ed 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 2008)  9 
Symposium 
 
enjoy large financial inflows. 
     The Obama campaign emphasized two 
main approaches for reducing U.S. oil 
consumption: increasing the fuel efficiency of 
new vehicles and accelerating the use of 
alternative transportation fuels. 
To raise fuel efficiency, the Obama 
campaign proposed a number of measures. 
First, an Obama administration would 
increase U.S. fuel economy standards by four 
percent per year over a number of years. 
Indeed, as a senator, Obama sponsored 
legislation to that effect. 
Second, the administration would offer $7 
billion in tax credits for the purchase of more 
fuel-efficient advanced-technology vehicles, 
and it would provide $4 billion in loans and 
tax credits to domestic auto manufacturers so 
that they could retool factories in order to 
build more fuel-efficient cars. 
Third, the government would invest directly in 
research and development in advanced vehicle 
technologies, especially batteries, and help to 
create a market for such cars by purchasing a 
large number of plug-in and all-electric 
vehicles. One overall goal would be to put one 
million highly fuel-efficient plug-in hybrids on 
the road by 2015. 
To promote the use of alternative fuels, the 
Obama administration would mandate that all 
vehicles be manufactured with a flexible fuel 
capability by the end of its first term. It would 
also invest federal resources into developing 
the most promising sustainable alternative 
fuels and building the infrastructure to support 
them, with the goal of incorporating at least 60 
billion gallons of advanced biofuels into the 
national fuel supply by 2030. A related 
measure would be to establish a low-carbon 
fuel standard to speed the introduction of non-
petroleum fuels. Fuel suppliers would be 
required to reduce the carbon content of their 
fuel by 5 percent by 2015 and by 10 percent 
by 2020. 
Several other proposed measures, while not 
directly aimed at reducing oil consumption, 
could nevertheless contribute to the 
achievement of that goal or at least to a 
reduction in U.S. oil imports. One is a 
proposed economy-wide cap-and-trade 
program to reduce carbon emissions. If this 
came anywhere near to achieving the goal of 
an 80 percent reduction below 1990 levels by 
2050, it would necessarily result in a 
substantial cut in oil use, since the combustion 
of oil accounts for roughly half of all U.S. 
carbon emissions. Another is the plan to invest 
$150 billion over ten years in a clean energy 
economy. Much of this money would be 
targeted at measures that would result in lower 
oil consumption, such as accelerated 
commercialization of plug-in-hybrids and 
advancing the next generation of biofuels and 
fuel infrastructure. 
Finally, the Obama administration would 
support increased U.S. domestic production of 
oil as a means of helping to prevent world 
prices from rising higher than they have. 
Although greater domestic production would 
not contribute to the goal of reducing oil 
consumption, it would reduce U.S. oil imports 
at least slightly. Nevertheless, the Obama 
campaign has been quick to emphasize that, 
given its small share of world oil reserves, the 
United States cannot drill its way to energy 
security. 
Given the current state of the U.S. 
economy, however, the Obama administration 
is likely to put the goal of reducing oil 
consumption on the back burner in the short 
run. Indeed, policies designed to reduce oil 
consumption are likely to conflict with efforts 
to halt and reverse the recent economic 
downturn, and vice-versa. The Obama 
campaign previously proposed an emergency 
energy rebate of $500 to $1000, to be paid for 
by a tax on oil company profits. The rebate 
would offset the increased prices that 
Americans have been paying for gasoline and 
are likely to pay for heating oil this winter. 
But however necessary and well-intentioned, 
such a rebate would eliminate some of the 
incentive to cut oil consumption, and possibly 
reduce money available for investment by oil 
companies in exploration and new production 
capacity. 
Even in the absence of the current 
economic crisis, moreover, one could question 
whether the policies proposed by the Obama 
campaign would be sufficient to achieve the 
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goal of reducing oil consumption by 3.5 mbd 
within 10 years. For example, the Obama plan 
provides no intermediate targets for the 
introduction of biofuels. But even the current 
renewable fuels standard, adopted in 2007, 
would reduce oil consumption by only about 2 
mbd no earlier than 2022. And its full 
implementation will depend on the 
development of cost-effective methods for the 
production of cellulosic ethanol and other 
advanced biofuels on a large scale, which do 
not yet exist. 
Likewise, the introduction of more fuel-
efficient vehicles and those with a plug-in 
capability will certainly help to reduce oil 
consumption over time. But given that the 
higher standards will be achieved only 
incrementally and the relatively slow turnover 
of the automotive fleet, traditionally about six 
to seven percent of vehicles per year, the full 
effects will not be felt for more than a decade. 
Even the immediate introduction of a million 
electric vehicles would reduce gasoline 
consumption by only a fraction of a percent, 
given that there are already more than 200 
million automobiles and light trucks on the 
road. 
It is worth noting, moreover, that the 
Obama plan does not include one measure that 
would be particularly effective at reducing oil 
consumption: a tax or a price floor to ensure 
that oil and gasoline prices remain high 
enough to encourage conservation and 
investment in alternatives. As recent 
experience has confirmed, high oil prices can 
have a big effect on consumption patterns. Yet 
a tax or price floor need not raise the price of 
gasoline as high as $4 per gallon in the short 
run in order to alter expectations sufficiently 
to induce sustained behavioral change. 
Finally, it may be worth asking whether the 
goal of the Obama plan is sufficient or 
ambitious enough. Even a 17 percent 
reduction in oil use would leave U.S. 
consumption levels, whether measured in 
terms of GDP or population, well above those 
of most other advanced industrialized 
countries. At least in the longer term, the 
United States will probably have to reduce 
consumption by an even greater amount in 
order to mitigate the negative economic, 
environmental, and national security 
consequences of its oil dependence. 
What implications could the Obama plan 
have for U.S. policy toward the Middle East? 
With the principal exception of the domestic 
responses to the oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S. 
policy has traditionally emphasized the use of 
foreign policy tools to address the concerns 
raised by American oil dependence, especially 
high oil prices and potential supply 
disruptions. As articulated during the 
presidential campaign, however, the Obama 
energy plan contains no explicit external 
dimension. 
In the short term at least, the implications 
are likely to be minimal for two reasons. First, 
as noted above, until the United States 
emerges from the current economic crisis, the 
new administration will emphasize saving jobs 
and promoting growth rather than reducing oil 
consumption. If anything, the ready 
availability of inexpensive oil will be seen as a 
means to that end, and the administration is 
likely to work as necessary with sympathetic 
producers like Saudi Arabia to keep the price 
of oil in the low to moderate range. 
Second, long-term concerns about 
maintaining stability in the Middle East for the 
sake of energy security have been at least 
temporarily eclipsed by the immediate 
challenges posed by Iraq and Iran. Although 
the evolution of the political situation in Iraq 
and the outcome of Iran’s alleged efforts to 
become a nuclear power will have potentially 
profound consequences for regional stability 
and thus the ability of the Persian Gulf to meet 
the world’s oil needs, the new administration 
will have to address these pressing issues on 
their own terms and necessarily give less 
consideration to the longer-term implications 
for energy security. 
Once these immediate domestic and 
international concerns have been addressed, 
however, the Obama administration will have 
to turn its attention to the question of what 
type of relationship it wants with the oil-
producing countries of the Middle East and the 
degree to which U.S. policy should be shaped 
by concerns about maintaining reliable access 
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to adequate supplies of oil at reasonable 
prices. Even if the Obama administration is 
successful in reducing U.S. oil consumption 
by 17 percent or even more, the United States 
will continue to import oil from the Persian 
Gulf. More importantly, the rest of the world--
and the health of the global economy--will 
remain heavily dependent on stable and 
perhaps even rising production levels in the 
region. Thus it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, for even an administration 
committed to change to break with the long-
standing imperative to intervene in the region 
in order to ensure energy security. 
 
*John S. Duffield is Professor Political 
Science at Georgia State University in Atlanta. 
He is the author of Over a Barrel: The Costs 
of U.S. Foreign Oil Dependence (Stanford 
University Press, 2007) and co-editor (with 
Peter J. Dombrowski) of Balance Sheet: The 
Iraq War and U.S. National Security (Stanford 
University Press, forthcoming 2009). His 
current research focuses on the politics of 
energy security in the United States and other 
industrialized countries. 
 
WHAT OBAMA SHOULD DO ABOUT 
RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
Mark N. Katz* 
 
Formulating an American foreign policy 
with regard to Russia in the Middle East will 
be complicated because some things Moscow 
is doing there are harmful to American 
interests while others are either not harmful or 
actually helpful. 
Moscow’s actions that are most harmful to 
American interests are its continued support 
for the Iranian nuclear program, and protecting 
it in the UN Security Council, as well as its 
arms sales to both Iran and Syria. Though less 
of an immediate threat, Russian cooperation 
with Middle East gas producers such as Iran, 
Qatar, and Algeria to form a “Gas OPEC” 
could have a negative economic and political 
impact on the West. 
By contrast, Moscow’s actions that are 
either not harmful or are actually helpful 
include: cooperating to some extent with U.S. 
and European efforts to prevent Iran from 
obtaining nuclear weapons, not providing Iran 
and Syria with the more advanced weapons 
systems that they want, and not supporting 
America’s opponents in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
In addition, Moscow maintains good relations 
not just with Arab governments allied to the 
United States but also with Israel--a far cry 
from its behavior during the Cold War when 
the USSR actively sought to weaken or even 
overthrow these governments. 
What the Obama administration obviously 
hopes for is that Moscow will cease those 
actions harmful to American interests while 
continuing those that are either helpful or not 
harmful. What it fears is that Moscow will 
continue or increase those actions that are 
harmful while ceasing those actions that are 
either helpful or not harmful. 
Moscow, though, is not likely to do what 
Washington either hopes or fears, but continue 
its current policy instead. Among other 
reasons, supporting Iran and Syria is valued by 
Russia because America opposes it. 
Supporting them in defiance of the United 
States makes Russia appear to be a great 
power--not least in its own eyes. By contrast, 
ceasing to do so, especially at America’s 
behest, would make Russia look weak and 
subservient at least in its leaders’ own self-
perception. 
On the other hand, even if Russian-
American relations deteriorate further than 
they already have, Moscow is unlikely to 
pursue policies that undermine America’s 
Arab allies or Israel. For while Moscow sees 
America as an opponent, it also sees radical 
Sunni Islamism as one. The more powerful the 
latter grows in the Middle East, the more it 
can do to undermine Moscow’s rule in the 
Muslim regions of Russia (including the 
northern Caucasus and Tatarstan). Pro-
American Arab governments, Israel, and even 
the American presence in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (so long as this continues) serve 
to keep these forces at bay. Despite its 
resentment toward the United States, the 
Kremlin has no interest in weakening their 
ability to perform this function. 
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